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This paper investigates the current turbulent state of copyright in the digital age, and 
explores the viability of alternative compensation systems that aim to achieve the 
same goals with fewer negative consequences for consumers and artists. To sustain 
existing business models associated with creative content, increased recourse to DRM 
(Digital Rights Management) technologies, designed to restrict access to and usage of 
digital content, is well underway. Considerable technical challenges associated with 
DRM systems necessitate increasingly aggressive recourse to the law. A number of 
controversial aspects of copyright enforcement are discussed and contrasted with 
those inherent in levy based compensation systems.  Lateral exploration of the 
copyright dilemma may help prevent some undesirable societal impacts, but with 
powerful coalitions of creative, consumer electronics and information technology 
industries having enormous vested interest in current models, alternative schemes are 
frequently treated dismissively. This paper focuses on consideration of alternative 




The digital age promises innumerable opportunities and benefits for society, but for IP 
regimes originating in the analogue era it presents many fundamental challenges. 
Much debate revolves around how to shape modern laws and digital technologies to 
retain existing IP regimes, so that traditional commercial and regulatory models can 
live on. Relatively little is said about alternatives based on the premise that current IP 
regimes need redesigning to better suit the digital world. 
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Copyright law is derived from the principle that neither the creator of a new work of 
authorship nor the general public should be able to appropriate all of the benefits that 
flow from the creation of a new, original work of authorship. It presumes that original 
forms of creative expression can belong to individuals, who have both a moral right to 
ownership and a legitimate economic right to derive material benefit from the use of 
these ideas and works by others as an incentive to create further original works. It 
presumes that the use of their original ideas and works should be subject to the laws 
of free and fair exchange, there should be adequate compensation of use by others, 
and there should be safeguards against misuse. At the same time, it recognises that 
original ideas and works are drawn from an existing pool of knowledge and creativity, 
and that there is therefore a need to guarantee that such ideas and works exist in the 
public domain for fair use by others, and that, moreover, such information is the life 
blood of democracy, commerce, and the development of future knowledge, so that 
broad access by the community to the widest possible pool of information, knowledge 
and forms of creative expression are a condition for participation in public life and the 
development of new knowledge. In order to balance these competing claims on 
knowledge, copyright thus divides up the possible rights in and uses of a work, giving 
control over some of these rights to the creators and distributors and control over 
others to the general public (Litman,  2001).  
 
The copyright system worked well while resources required to produce and distribute 
“pirated” material were relatively expensive, and while copy degradation was 
unavoidable. These deterrents no longer exist, and in fact the complete opposite is 
now true.  Inevitably, the advent of digital technologies and the Internet have led to a 
dramatic escalation of copyright infringement, more commonly and misleadingly 
referred to as “piracy”. Moreover, embedded within copyright laws are a set of 
competing normative visions of intellectual property, as something that can be 
privately owned as property, and as something that is central to the principles of 
freedom of speech, equitable access to public information, and economic efficiency. 
These questions have been accentuated by the process whereby those who have 
established ownership of copyrighted works – who are, by the nature of contracts in 
the creative industries, far more likely to be the distributors of creative content rather 
than its originators – have constituted themselves as a powerful interest group whose 
interests sit over and above, and frequently in opposition to, the much larger, but far 
more dispersed, group of end-users of copyrighted or copyrightable material (Bettig, 
1996; Viadhyanathan, 2001; Perelman, 2002). 
      
Industry response has focused on the development of DRM systems. Many definitions 
of DRM proliferate, but it can be generally described as the set of technical and legal 
mechanisms applied to help control copyrighted and other protected material in the 
digital environment. Despite ongoing DRM research and development, it will always 
by nature remain a subset of possible deterrents to copyright infringement. A key 
question, with this inherent limitation in mind, is whether or not the costs and 
repercussions of DRM justify its status as the primary solution to the current dilemma. 
Laws which help create a criminal underworld ought only be implemented where 
benefits clearly outweigh this hard-to-measure, but costly drawback. A law that is 
regularly broken by “ordinary” people, and turned a blind eye to by the authorities (or 
allowed in some countries), shows obvious signs of needing change.  
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This paper compares two different, fundamental directions for handling the dilemma 
of IP in the digital world. One option is to maintain the current copyright regime, 
whilst necessarily taking stronger measures to lock up IP in order to sustain it. This 
entails increased use of technological and legal rights-enforcement mechanisms. The 
other alternative is to set both IP and technology free by changing the current 
copyright regime, and using alternative compensation systems (such as levies) to 
achieve the same goals. If the initial instigators of copyright law had instead used 
some taxation mechanism to achieve the goals of copyrights alluded to earlier, we 
would today have an entirely different scenario. Major changes of an entrenched 
regime require firm evidence to illustrate their overall benefits are real and 
worthwhile. Prototype alternative IP systems are therefore necessary both to collect 
such evidence, and to experiment with system design. By describing the worsening 
problems in the current regime whilst facing the difficulties of implementing 
alternative compensation schemes, it is hoped that further investigation into the 
problems, and support for alternative IP systems, will be encouraged.  
      
It is possible that foresight into the scale of problems facing us today might have 
persuaded early decision makers against implementing the copyright regime. It is 
clear, however, that a levy regime entails an entirely different set of problems. This 
paper aims to contrast some of the pros and cons of each option. If alternative IP 
systems can better maximise technological and social benefits in the digital age, 
whilst fulfilling the goals behind copyright law, such options ought to be explored 
more fully. In times of rapid change generalist thinking is beneficial to question the 
validity of the existing paradigm. Investigating alternative directions rather than 
remaining entrenched in an increasingly shaky regime may present a route with fewer 
obstacles and greater promise for the future.   
PROBLEMS FACING THE CURRENT COPYRIGHT REGIME 
In order to sustain the current copyright regime in the environment of widespread ease 
of infringement, part of the technical solution is greater use of compliant end-user 
devices, with incorporated virtual machines capable of enforcing content licence 
restrictions. This is not an easy task since such DRM systems will require client 
rendering devices with trusted processing, input and output paths (Lacy et al, 1997). 
Required modifications to current PC architecture will therefore affect motherboards, 
CPU, display and input devices. The technical complexities necessary for these types 
of DRMs must make them costly measures. The idea is that users will be unable to 
tamper with a device without compromising its ability to attest its compliance or 
trustworthiness (Schechter et al, 2003). Compliant devices can be relied upon to 
communicate with content providers, using remote attestation mechanisms built into 
hardware. Embedded unique private keys will enable identification and authentication 
of both devices and users. Non-compliant or compromised devices, unable to 
convince content providers of their trustworthiness to comply with licensing 
conditions, will consequently have reduced content access and usage freedom. 
      
Greater use of Technological Protection Measures (TPMs), enabling end-to-end 
content protection via closed systems, is currently a favoured solution for copyright 
owners. If they can maintain greater usage control over their digital content then pay-
per-usage business models can be applied to raise revenue from their works. Their 
focus is on sustaining current copyright regimes and retaining existing lucrative 
creative industry business models, via increased use of TPMs (Technical Protection 
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Measures) combined with aggressive legal pursuit of parties violating copyright, 
contract and controversial anti-circumvention (of protection mechanisms) laws. The 
trend is towards online delivery of content to consumers subject to a number of 
conditions and with restrictions. DRM systems can attach usage rules to electronically 
distributed content, along with security mechanisms designed to enforce them. If they 
fail, as they eventually typically do, the law is waiting in the wings to back them up. 
Users attempting to circumvent protection measures, or remove embedded copyright 
information, are in nearly all cases breaking the law. Users who interfere with TPMs 
and create infringing copies can technically be tracked and exposed to litigation. 
Legal backup now goes further than this. Laws now prevent the creation, manufacture 
or marketing of circumvention tools that are designed to compromise technical 
security measures. This defence-in-depth approach to maintain the current copyright 
regime has numerous far-reaching implications.  
Diminished consumer privacy 
DRM technologies provide functional capability to monitor consumer viewing, 
listening and reading habits. An excerpt from a Microsoft definition of DRM clearly 
illustrates this point: “DRM is a set of technologies content owners can use to protect 
their copyrights and stay in closer contact with their customers” (Microsoft, 2003, 
[our emphasis]). The carefully phrased language disguises potential privacy-invading 
monitoring capability in a consumer-centric spin. This example of slanted vendor 
marketing is an illustration of the widespread practice of “perception engineering”, 
whereby an impression of inevitability about the corrosion of consumer rights is 
encouraged. 
      
Because valuable collected data can be used for market research, there is a real 
incentive for consumer monitoring. For many consumers this represents an 
unacceptable erosion of personal privacy. In fact it was respect for the privacy of 
consumers in their own homes that led Germany to be the first initiator of levy based 
systems for private copying (Hugenholtz et al, 2003). 
      
A number of significant concerns surrounding DRM have been persuasively 
articulated by privacy advocates (Cohen, 2003). Although pressure from consumer 
groups and academics is likely to result in some onus to embed privacy protection 
measures, because monitoring capabilities are inherent in DRM technologies, there 
can be no guarantees that Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET) mechanisms are 
actually adhered to. This tendency has been illustrated in the area of Web privacy 
policies. With or without consumers’ knowledge or consent, DRM technologies have 
the potential to invade their personal privacy. Moving into the realm of paranoia, 
DRM mechanisms could conceivably assist politically motivated entities to survey 
consumer device hard drives. In the words of John Perry Barlow: “Digital Rights 
Management today is Political Rights Management tomorrow” (cited in Krempl, 
2003). 
 
Reduced innovation potential 
Trusted platforms enabling compliant systems have “black box” characteristics that 
might severely impact upon technological innovation by shielding hidden interfaces 
under the guise of security. “Trusted” technologies give software creators the ability 
to make and lock in decisions about who their applications can interoperate with 
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[Anderson, 2003]. The tamper-resistant nature of trusted systems implies that any user 
producing interoperable software beyond the scope specified must have broken the 
law by circumventing a TPM. This feature of trusted platform technology challenges 
future interoperability and innovative adaptation potential. The current capability to 
adapt software and promote open systems has provided many benefits to date, so any 
legislative efforts that hold back technological innovation potential might have 
inconceivably far reaching consequences. 
 
The United States Committee for Economic Development (CED) has recently argued 
that current responses to what it terms the “perfect storm” of changes to technology, 
law and business practices associated with the digitization of content have shifted the 
balance of intellectual property law too far towards the controllers of existing 
copyright. This has been to the detriment of what it terms second-order innovators, or 
“the creators of new social value based on existing copyrighted works” (CED, 2004: 
1), in ways that not only have the potential to undermine the public domain, but act as 
a fetter upon innovation and economic growth. This is because, for the most part, 
innovation is incremental and cumulative, and innovations for the future draw upon 
the copyrighted works of the recent past i.e. every first creator of a copyrightable 
innovation “stands on the shoulders of giants” (CED, 2004: 9).  
      
Proliferating online piracy, particularly in the music industry, has led affected 
stakeholders to seek out methods to attack peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing networks 
and applications. The consequences of impeding ongoing development of such 
potentially beneficial technologies, defended in (Hausmann, 2002) as being “both the 
origin and the future of the Internet”, should not be underestimated. Instead of 
sabotaging P2P networks, they could instead be harnessed to assist with the 
implementation of new business models. The undisputed effectiveness of “viral 
marketing” practices, whereby users promote and share material with friends, might 
be usefully applied to create more efficient content delivery networks. For example: 
user A downloads (and pays 99 cents for) a song they can retain and which can be 
sent to four other people - users B,C,D, and E. Each of them can only play the song 
five times after which it directs them to an independent Digital Shopfront or major 
online store (such as Sanity or HMV) which offers them the track to purchase. If they 
do so – they receive the same offer as user A, who then receives a credit on their next 
purchase for each new customer they bring to the digital distributor [Butterworth, 
2004]. Such a system offers both independent distributors as well as major 
retailers/distributors a way to become more involved in digital delivery. And 
importantly, it gives a space for independent music and its distributors to forge closer 
relationships with potential new audiences. 
 
 
Spoiled content fidelity 
Two core technologies used for DRM are encryption and digital watermarking. 
Encryption is, of course, essential to prevent snooping during transit and while in 
storage. But to be rendered, content must eventually be decrypted, so digital 
watermarks are designed to remain unobtrusively and persistently hidden within 
content. The threat to content fidelity is that persistence can only be achieved at the 
cost of unobtrusiveness. A prominent characteristic of digital watermarking is the 
existence of numerous unavoidable tradeoffs, affecting cost, complexity and 
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watermark perceptibility (Craver et al, 2000). The likelihood for content fidelity to 
noticeably deteriorate is increased when robustness is prioritised, a consequence not 
necessarily in the best interest of either consumers or creators. 
      
Extensive recent research activity has been dedicated towards developing new 
“robust” watermarking methods capable of sustaining a subset of typical processing, 
file-handling and editing functions, and also of some malicious attacks. File 
compression, for example, presents particular challenges for watermark designers. 
When robustness is a primary goal, the aim is to insert marks in a manner that will 
resist accidental or malicious removal without simultaneous destruction of the work. 
The current, and arguably permanent, state of watermarking technology is that any 
existing technique is vulnerable to attack. There are considerable differences in 
resilience and implementation practicality amongst modern watermarking schemes, 
and ongoing research continues to generate improved schemes and new attacks. 
Because the current copyright regime creates incentives for attackers, production of 
tolerant robust watermarking techniques is currently a high priority.  
Ongoing commercial piracy 
The current copyright regime invites commercial piracy to flourish, with a motivation 
proportional to market size and content value. If content prices are inflated and access 
restricted, then pirate incentives will be fuelled. A different, though associated  
perspective is given by Kevin Bermeister regarding illegal downloads. Bermeister is 
co-founder of Brilliant Digital Entertainment, who established Altnet, which focuses 
on Peer to Peer network solutions for digital content distribution and marketing (one 
of its largest traffic partners include the P2P file sharing program Kazaa). Bermeister 
(2004) sees the likes of Kazaa as breaking down overly restrictive IP practices by 
major record companies as well as offering more opportunities to individual artists to 
build a more direct relationship with their audience. His outlook of copyright 
becoming a ‘diluted concept’ to be replaced by an artist’s ‘trademark’ as P2P 
eventually generates more diverse content channels sits uneasily with the hard detail 
of how to protect the financial investment of IP owners and artists. However there is 
some legitimacy in his claims that the legal battles and profound changes operations 
such as his have brought are a necessary part of the path to better digital rights 
management. 
   
History has continued to demonstrate that with sufficient motivation to attack, any 
TPM will eventually be broken (Biddle et al, 2002). Anti-circumvention laws will not 
deter commercial pirates who have flagrant disregard for the law. Any real attempt to 
sufficiently deter determined, resourceful pirates requires strong security measures 
which are generally unjustifiably expensive for protecting low-value content. 
Information security standards outline how appropriate security measures are selected, 
following a risk assessment process including a cost-benefit analysis.  
      
It is widely realised that no system can guarantee perfect security, so minimisation 
rather than elimination of commercial piracy is a realistic goal, but only with 
accompanying increased costs for consumers. Layers of TPMs, including numerous 
failures, such as the CSS (Content Scrambling System) protection on DVDs, 
noteworthy for its widespread use and poor design, have led to escalating costs that 
are ultimately passed on to consumers. Considerable resources are expended in design 
and implementation of TPMs, particularly complex watermarking technologies. 
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Although these may result in some reduction of commercial piracy, the subsequent 
reduction in consumer acceptance due to rising costs and decreased convenience must 
be taken into account. 
 
Greater imbalance in copyright bargain 
There has been much commentary on the trend towards erosion of “fair use”, or “fair 
dealing, against the consumer rights side of the copyright bargain. The set of 
exceptions to the exclusive rights of copyright owners was carefully crafted by 
lawmakers to create the desired balance between owners and the general public. One 
of the problems arising from attempts to apply technological means to protect 
copyrights is that it is considered impossible to program fair use exceptions into DRM 
systems. This is because fair use is a complex legal mechanism, with outcomes 
dependent on individual aspects of each case. Clearly, case-by-case decisions cannot 
be defined algorithmically for programming into DRM systems. This is likely to 
reduce consumer capability to exercise fair use rights if DRM systems remove 
operation of these copyright exceptions, thereby tipping the delicate copyright balance 
further against consumers (Burk & Cohen, 2001). 
      
Copyright-based industries, collectively referred to as Creative Industries (CI), or 
producers of IP, are an extremely powerful force in the world today. They represent 
one of the most rapidly growing sectors of the world economy in terms of GDP, job 
growth and international trade (Siwek, 2002). CI power and influence was sufficient 
to successfully lobby for tougher laws, including most controversially, the new anti-
circumvention provisions introduced by the WCT (World IP Organisation Copyright 
Tribunal), and enacted by most member states. Such laws provide even ineffective 
TPMs artificial muscles by simply prohibiting their circumvention. Gradually 
consumers are becoming increasingly comparatively powerless stakeholders in the 
copyright bargain. 
ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION SYSTEMS 
A starkly contrasting option to consider involves changing the current copyright 
regime to allow free private copying and online downloading, in exchange for levies 
paid on those devices and services that enable it.  Following a brief history of levy 
systems for IP, some alternative compensation models are next described and 
characterised. 
 
Existing levy-based systems for IP 
There are already in existence around the world over forty private copying exemption 
systems, primarily for music and reprography, that use revenue gathered via levies on 
blank storage media, and/or recording devices to distribute amongst content owners, 
creators and producers (Australian Copyright Council, 2001).  
      
Historically, copyright protection did not extend to private copying by individuals, but 
as the distinction between public acts and private acts began to blur with the advent of 
sound and video-recording equipment, regulation of private use became inevitable. It 
was in response to the fact that infringement claims against individuals creating 
private home copies were considered unenforceable, due to a person’s right to privacy 
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in their own home, that levies were first introduced (Hugenholtz et al, 2003). To 
compensate rights holders for the common practice of private home copying, the 
German Supreme Court initiated a statutory equipment levy in 1965. Other member 
states of the EU soon followed suit with variations of the German regime (Australian 
Copyright Council, 2001). 
 
Existing levy systems suffer from a number of flaws, and like all IP systems, need to 
adjust to the realities of the digital age. There are a number of proposals to extend the 
breadth of regulated levy systems to incorporate more forms of digital content and 
distribution channels, including the Internet. Widespread existence of public libraries 
illustrates a long-held community belief in providing free access to expressions of 
human creativity and knowledge for all people. Public libraries are funded by 
Government taxes, and are already evolving to provide access to digital media as well 
as books. It has been strongly argued that expressions of human creativity and 
knowledge, easily accessible due to modern digital networked technologies, have 
“public good” characteristics and hence fall into the category of goods eligible for 
regulation by Government (Fisher, 2004). Following this argument it seems 
reasonable that the public library concept, traditionally focused primarily on books, 
could justifiably be extended and broadened to encompass all forms of digital content. 
However, at a recent music conference in Brisbane discussing DRM (Big Sound, 
2004), a number of industry stakeholders representing music publishing rights, 
distributors, musicians and music industry bodies put forward a number of reasons 
why the major record companies shy from entering into formal arrangements related 
to large scale file sharing (such as Kazaa) or setting up formidable online distribution 
– or libraries. Long established and complex business models and legal issues in each 
territory were seen as models the majors don’t wish to break with as well as the issue 
of impacts on employment in the distribution and retail sector. While it is probably 
true that libraries may have little impact on book sales, the consumption of music and 
films for example are more closely aligned with computer technology than books (at 
least for the present). This makes the impact of freely available music and film more 
of an issue to these retail and distribution sectors, than it is for the book publishing 
industry and the free or near free availability of the written word in libraries.  
 
Fisher’s levy-based model 
One of the leading proponents of alternative models proposes a government 
administered compensation system, encompassing free online access to music and 
movies (Fisher, 2004). Terry Fisher’s model addresses the growing problem of P2P 
sharing, not currently encompassed by private copying levy systems. He proposes 
taxing all goods and services that are used to gain access to music and film. This 
includes recording equipment, storage media and ISP services, either to download 
files or to stream recordings from the Internet. Fisher outlines some necessary 
changes in US copyright law to eliminate current prohibitions on reproduction, 
distribution, adaptation and performance of audio and video recordings over the 
Internet (Fisher, 2004). 
      
In an online draft release of his forthcoming book, Fisher includes initial rough 
estimates of percentage revenue losses to the music and movie industries if free, 
unlimited non-commercial file sharing was introduced. These estimates are then used 
to arrive at an overall ball-park US tax rate for 2004 of 15.88% (with an 
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administration cost factored in) on the sales price of targeted items and services 
necessary to fairly compensate affected industry businesses.  
      
In the Fisher system content owners are paid their proportional share of collected tax 
revenues based on the relative popularity of their work, ascertained by estimating the 
frequency of consumption. It is this aspect of any levy-based model that is often 
discussed due to its vulnerabilities. Any system reliant upon automated online 
counting is a prime target for compromise by potential fraudulent “ballot-stuffing” 
code, by dishonest content owners wishing to acquire more than their fair share of the 
revenue pool. A number of alternative mechanisms to estimate popularity are being 
discussed, including use of sufficiently extensive customer surveys, and voting 
tokens. There are many specialist customer survey organisations well practiced in 
applying sampling techniques to gather and analyse data, so this alternative is a strong 
candidate.  
      
Two main dilemmas facing Fisher’s, and other similar models are: the problem of 
achieving incorruptible popularity estimates; and the possibility of tax rates rising 
over time due to increasing corrosion of affected business revenues. Technological 
advancements are likely to further increase the popularity of online downloading and 
cause reduced spending on traditional channels. A topic dominating discussion at a 
recent alternative compensation systems workshop, at Harvard Law School in 
December 2004, was whether or not alternative compensation systems ought to be 
compulsory or voluntary. Opinion remained divided on the issue.  
 
Other alternative models 
Most “alternative” IP models focus to some degree on encompassing free access to, 
and non-commercial copying of online and contributed content, accessed either online 
or by traditional means. A number of variants exist already, and new models are under 
trial or discussion. In Brazil, for example, the Minister of Culture is supporting a new 
initiative to put all locally produced culture into a central pool made freely available 
online, to help promote local artists and maintain Brazil’s cultural heritage.  
 
Voluntary alternative compensation systems 
Alternative compensation systems can be run on a voluntary basis, along the lines of 
existing collecting societies, whereby contributed content is centrally administered, 
stored, and made available to the public. Such a closely regulated system would use 
some combination of techniques to monitor relative popularity of contributed works. 
Consumers could then access content either online or from distributed physical 
outlets, such as public libraries or educational institutions. Users would then be free to 
store and copy content obtained from the system at will, for their own private non-
commercial use. Any pooled revenue collected by a voluntary system is divided and 
distributed according to relative popularity weighting after administration costs are 
deducted. 
      
In such a system, content would be centrally registered and marked with a unique 
identifier, such as the DOI (Digital Object Identifier). This would allow easy tracking, 
administering, indexing and unique identification of any contributed content. If 
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content owners were convinced of the merits of the system, and of its capability to 
provide a fair and regular income, they would be more likely to wish to opt into a 
voluntary scheme. This means that any levy rates applied must be sufficient to 
generate the necessary revenue pool needed to attract content owners in. This opt-in 
style of alternative model is likely to be more palatable to CI than compulsory 
schemes, since it leaves more choices open. Content owners who prefer to protect 
their works using TPMs can then remain free to do so.  
 




Levy-based systems place significant responsibility upon decision-makers, 
particularly regarding setting of levy rates, and revenue distribution allocations. 
Because of their impact on quantity of content contributed, as well as on consumer 
support, levy rates are an especially delicate balancing mechanism for voluntary 
systems. Levy rates might be kept reasonably modest, since content owners of popular 
material have an opportunity to augment their revenue via familiar value-add 
methods, such as live performances, cinema attendance, and merchandising. 
Individual levy rates on eligible devices and services might be more fairly imposed, 
based on analysis of their typical usage for activities involving accessing, rendering, 
storing, copying and redistributing digital content. Targeted devices and services 
could then be taxed on sales prices weighted according to typical usage, as determined 
by regular consumer surveys. 
      
One of the common objections frequently raised about levy systems is that levies 
would still be paid on devices, disks or services even if they are not actually used to 
access, render or copy copyrighted material. Although valid, this criticism can be 
partially reduced by illustrating that on average, consumers currently spend more on 
recorded entertainment than they would pay in levies (Fisher, 2004). Industry sectors 
whose products become targeted by levies, including consumer electronics and ISPs 
are likely to object, and pass on increased prices to customers. However, free access 




Alternative compensation systems require minimal DRM technology, primarily to 
mark content for identification purposes. A unique identifying sequence, such as the 
DOI, can be persistently embedded in digital content using watermarking technology. 
By restricting the watermark payload to the unique identifier, tradeoffs against 
perceptibility and robustness are reduced. With extensive research underway in the 
digital watermarking field, many different techniques with varying degrees of 
practicality already exist. Watermark method selection depends on the specific 
requirements of the application. A key issue for most creators is to achieve 
recognition for their work, thereby satisfying their moral right of attribution. For this 
application, techniques that “redundantly” apply a watermark repeatedly throughout 
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the content would be particularly useful. This feature would mean that the minimal 
invisible/inaudible mark is detectable from even small pieces of a work, making it 
relatively easy for creators of derived works to incorporate suitably identified samples 
of others’ works within their own compositions. There could then be potential to build 
plug-ins for publishing applications to read, extract or insert watermarks, and also 
possibly to perform rights database look-ups to provide further details.   
      
Embedding an identifier, such as DOI, into the content itself, provides capability to 
easily hook into some distributed system of rights databases to extract additional 
information. Thus the embedded DOI links to records holding comprehensive (yet 
generally static) content metadata, creator and ownership details, including those of 
any contained derived works.  
 
Watermarks have many potential applications, but a number of inherent limitations. 
The most challenging aspect of watermarking is probably striving for robustness 
(particularly against malicious attacks). While robustness is a priority for DRM 
systems protecting content in the current copyright regime, it loses importance in a 
regime where content is “free”. With significantly diminished incentive for deliberate 
removal of watermarks, content fidelity becomes less of an inevitable trade off.  
 
Revenue distribution 
One of the significant challenges for any levy system is determining how to distribute 
collected taxes fairly. Relative values of different genres of creative work must be 
factored in: clearly a movie is “worth” more than a song, because it costs significantly 
more to create. In the current system, market forces efficiently determine relative 
values of entertainment genres. Once the revenue pool is divided amongst genres, 
distribution to individual owners is based on relative popularity estimates.  
 
Alternative system prototypes 
Supporting evidence to justify redesign of the current copyright system in the form of 
working alternative prototypes is required. Low-cost prototypes can be used to prove 
the concept whilst providing additional community benefits to justify their existence, 
such as providing support for new and upcoming local creators. Access to an 
“alternative” prototype would easily attract content from new emerging creators and 
free content would obviously be willingly contributed. As a prototype gains exposure 
and popularity, and establishes a reputation amongst content creators, higher value 
content is more likely to be contributed to the system. Initially, a prototype might be 
funded by some form of grant, but to be commercially viable, the system would need 
to collect sufficient revenue to cover administration costs and to allow for modest 
payments to owners of relatively popular content. Adjustment of the levy rates 
applied will then partially determine the level of higher value content that is attracted 
into the system, and catalyse expansion of the prototype. Data and social trends can 
then be collected and monitored and documented to demonstrate the viability and 
challenges of alternative compensation systems. 
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Piracy and privacy in levy-based systems 
Commercial piracy would be effectively eliminated by a system that provides 
contributed content freely to all taxpayers. Without the considerable technical 
challenge of somehow having to disallow copying, fewer restricting TPMs are 
needed, so in a levy based regime not only the content, but also technological devices 
are “unlocked” and set free.  
      
Fewer TPMs, and free private copying remove the need for legal back-up to seek out, 
catch and prosecute infringers. Along with the obvious cost savings, consumers can 
maintain anonymity to a far greater degree, without the danger of having their 
viewing, listening and reading habits monitored and tracked by external third parties.  
 
Greater influence for creative artists 
It is likely that a greater percentage of CI revenues would go directly to creators in a 
system eliminating many considerable overheads present in the current copyright 
regime. Regime change enabling greater ease for new artists to contribute or modify 
existing works and reach an audience, would benefit creators as well as consumers. In 
the digital age, dramatic reductions in costs of production and distribution should in 
theory lead to an increased variety of artists and works. As dis-intermedition in new 
content channels increases, this leads to a process without the controlling and editing 
roles of many of the current regime “middlemen”: anyone can publish and share 
creative material. Thus a levy-.based system turns the world into one of controlled 
cultural anarchy.  
 
CONCLUSION 
As digital rights enforcement technologies continue to develop and roll out into the 
marketplace, opportunities to redesign the IP system slip away. Because much is at 
stake for consumers, it is important to open up valid debate to consider alternatives to 
the struggling copyright regime. DRM technologies may have a crucial role to play in 
the commercial sector for protecting high-value and critical content, where greater 
content usage control is required and inherent drawbacks are warranted. It is not so 
clear, however, that these developing technologies are appropriately applied to protect 
all IP. A primary goal for copyright owners of most entertainment content is 
widespread distribution and exposure, primarily to acquire greater recognition and 
therefore revenue earning potential. This goal is not assisted by technologies designed 
to restrict usage and access. 
      
It is important to carefully consider costs and societal repercussions caused by 
applying DRM technologies to control rampant copyright infringement so easily 
performed in the digital age. Although the right to make copies is central to the 
integrity of the current copyright system, it has been suggested that due to the very 
“centrality of copying to use of digital technology, reproduction is no longer an 
appropriate way to measure infringement” (Litman, 2002). 
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The time is right to consider alternative models to seek a more workable solution that 
better suits the modern world and achieves a more even balance in the copyright 
bargain. It is clearly essential to weigh up the pros and cons of all models aiming to 
solve the “public goods” problem for IP, and to choose the best possible option for 
society, before it is too late to change.  
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